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In this study, we apply the J-test to a 
simple IS-LM model to test the relative 
effectiveness of fiscal and monetary 
policy on inflation and unemployment 
for the Australian economy over the 
period 1961-1990. Empirical ecvidence 
shows that there exists no significant 
relationship between the supply of (or 
demand for) money with inflation and 
unemployment. It is fiscal policy which 
is effective in managing both inflation 
and unemployment.
I  Introduction
Since the early 1970s, Australia has experienced high rates of 
inflation, relatively weak economic growth and rising 
unemployment.1 The purpose of this paper is to compare the 
relative effectiveness of the fiscal and monetary policies in 
controlling inflation and unemployment. Hence, we have two 
hypotheses: the Keynesian model and the monetarist model 
for inflation and unemployment respectively. When the 
emphasis is on the supply of (or demand for) money as the 
sole contributing factor of inflation and unemployment, we 
have what is known as the monetarist approach. On the other 
hand, when the emphasis is only on taxes and government 
expenditures as the main determinants of inflation and 
unemployment, we come to what has been called the 
Keynesian approach.2 The validity of these models is being 
tested here by employing the J-test proposed by Davidson and 
MacKinnon (1981) on the time series data of Australia for the 
period 1961 to 1990. However, the 1983 Accord might have led 
to a structural change in the economy and affect the 
relationship between fiscal and monetary policies on inflation 
and unemployment. Therefore, before applying the J-Test, a 
test for structural change would be carried out by using the 
dummy variables devices. The structure of the paper is as 
follows: the 1983 Accord is described in next section. Section III 
discusses the model and the properties of the J-test, while 
Section IV gives the empirical results. Conclusion is given in 
Section V.
1 OECD Economic Surveys (Australia) 1983-84, June 1984, p. 7.
2 See Dombusch and Fischer (1982), and Perkins (1982).
n. The Accord
In February 1983, a Statement of Accord by the Australian 
Labor Party and the Australian Council of Trade Unions 
regarding economic policy was ratified by a special conference 
of unions. The main elements of the Accord include support 
for a centralised system of wage determination and the 
establishment of a Price Surveillance Authority. Agreement 
was also reached that the maintenance of real wages should be 
a key objective, although this should be an objective over time 
in a. period of economic crisis.^
The policy adopted by the Government elected in March 
1983 differed substantially from those in earlier years in that 
inflation and unemployment were dealt simultaneously with 
consultation and consensus. The Government pursued a 
degree of fiscal stimulus in the 1983-84 Budget, combined with 
broadly neutral monetary policy to avoid the potentially 
inflationary effect of fiscal stimulus. The Accord argued for a 
return to centralised wage fixation, and with government's 
support for full cost of living adjustments. Unions, however, 
agreed to consult government when formulating claims.4 To 
aid the prices and incomes agreement, a Price Surveillance 
Authority has been established to monitor prices nationally in 
areas where competition were limited. In short, the approach 
consists of an expansionary fiscal policy, a non-inflationary 
monetary policy and an accord on prices and incomes with the 
trade union. As a result, it provides a brake on inflation and 
avoids upward pressure on interest rates.5
3 ibid., p. 59.
4 Maxwell, P., p. 236.
5 op. cit., OECD Economic Surveys (Australia) 1983-84, p. 26.
HL The J-Test
Consider the following two linear non-nested regression 
models: the Keynesian and monetarist models of inflation and 
unemployment respectively. The possible determinants of the 
monetarist inflation model include money supply, which can 
be specified simply as
Ho: P= ctg + OjM + ^
On the other hand, the determinants of the Keynesian 
inflation model consists of tax receipts and government 
expenditure. This can be written as
Hj: P=  Pq + p^T + P2G + ^2
In order to apply the J-test, we specify a maintained 
hypothesis Ho and the alternative Hi. Since H i is not nested 
within Ho and that Ho is not nested within H i, therefore, the 
truth of Ho implies the falsity of Hi and vice versa.£ In other 
words, this suggests that there is information in Hi that can 
significantly improve the explanatory power of Ho. We are, 
therefore, led to ask whether Ho is adequate. For instance, the 
equation for testing between money supply (or Ho) and taxes 
(or H i) as the possible cause of inflation can be presented as
P = (l - AXoq + ctjM) + xf* + v
where X is a mixing parameter, and P is the OLS predictor of P 
(the rate of inflation) under H i:
6 op. cit., Davidson, R. and J.G. MacKinnon, 1981, p. 782.
P=lWiT
where T is independent of v by assumption, and Pi is also 
asymptotically independent of v, since the influence of any 
particular error terms on the estimates tend to zero as the 
sample size tends to infinity. Hence, J3 will be independent of v 
and thereby the significance of \ can be tested by using the 
conventional asymptotic t-test.7 If Ho is true, the true value of A, 
-Is zero. The t-statistics of A, are conditional on the truth of Ho 
rather than Hi. Therefore, a t-statistic which is valid for testing 
the truth of Ho will not be valid for testing the truth of Hi. In 
order to test H i, the roles of Ho and Hi can be reversed, and the 
test is to be carried out again.8
In this paper, we specify six hypotheses and their six 
alternatives for testing the cause of inflation and 
unemployment respectively, which can be written as follows:
Monetary policy as maintained hypothesis:
1. Ho: Monetary policy H i: Tax (T)
2  Ho: Monetary policy H i: Government expenditure (G)
3. Ho; Monetary policy H i: fiscal policy (T and G)
Fiscal policy as maintained hypothesis:
4  Ho: Tax (T) H i: Monetary policy
5. Ho: Government expenditure (G) H i: Monetary policy
6. Hq: Fiscal policy (T and G) H i: Monetary policy
7 ibid.
8 ibid., p. 783.
IV. Empirical Findings
The 1983 Accord might have caused possible changes in the 
structure of the economy. It would be expected that response of 
inflation and unemployment to fiscal and monetary policies 
would be different in the pre- and post-Accord 1983 periods. A 
test for this structural change is being carried out here by using 
dummy variables. Consider the simple IS-LM model of a 
policy mix of inflation,
Pt = the rate of change in the inflation rate
Tt = the rate of change in total government tax
receipts
Gt = the rate of change in total government 
expenditure
Mt = the rate of growth in money supply, M2.
The unrestricted equation becomes
Pt = Po + P lD  + P2T t+ P3DT t+P4G t+ P 5 D Q  + = P6Mt + PzDM t + eit
Pt= ao + aiTt + o^Gt + (X3Mt + eit
where
where
0 for the pre-1983 period
1 otherwise
Similarly, the unrestricted equation for unemployment is,
UMt =  TO +  Yi D +  Y^Tt + Y3DT t +  Y4Gt +  75DGt + TfcMt + TtfDMt +  *2t 
where
UMt = the rate of change in unemployment rate, and
0 for the pre-1983 period
1 otherwiseD =
The estimated results using annual Australian data are 
given as follows:
For the period 1961-1990
P = 0.04 + 0.69D + 4.19T - 7.9DT + 0.17G + 0.37DG - 3.24 M + 1.43DM 
(0.10) (0.46) (1.75) (-0.75) (0.08) (0.07) (-0.90) (0.19)
IT2 = 0.09 RSS = 10.11 D.W. = 1.18 d.f. = 22
For the period 1965-1990
UM = 0.13 + 0.14D - 1.38T + 0.29DT + 3.61G - 3.78DG - 0.93M - 0.08DM 
(0.37) (0.16) (-0.76) (0.05) (2.71) (-122) (-0.41) (0.02)
TP = 0.22 RSS = 2.63 D.W. = 2.60 d.f. = 18 
(t values are in parentheses.)
The results for both the inflation and unemployment 
equations indicated that all the t-values of ps' (1, 3, 5, 7) and ys' 
(1, 3, 5, 7) are insignificantly different from zero, and this 
implies that there is no evidence of any structural change in 
both the relationship of fiscal and monetary policies with 
inflation and unemployment. We are also interested in the 
overall effect of the Accord on both equations (that is, in 
testing if ps' (1, 3, 5, 7) and ys' (1, 3, 5, 7) as a group are all equal
to zero.) The calculated F[4,18] and F[4,14] statistics for both the 
inflation and unemployment model are 0.16 and 0.98 
respectively, which are obviously less than the corresponding 
F values (2.93 and 3.11) at 5 per cent significance level. Thus we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis and conclude that the 
dummy variables as a group are not significantly different 
from zero. This implies that there is no structural change in 
the post-Accord 1983 period. The estimated results of the J-Test 
for the whole period (1961-1990) are given in Table 1 and 2 
with the variables marked m as the maintained hypotheses. 
The values below the variables denote the estimated t-statistics 
of the parameter \ of the particular variable. Durbin-Watson's 
d-statistics and -2 log likelihood of each model are also given 
in the table.
It is shown that, with monetary policy (via the use of M2) as 
a maintained hypothesis, both tax (T) and combined tax and 
government expenditure (TG) have significant t-statistics. 
Based on the Aka ike Information Criterion (AIC) (Akaike, 
1973)9, the model with tax as policy appears to be the better 
model. Government expenditure, however, appears to have 
no significant impact on inflation. This confirms the relative 
effectiveness of tax as an instrument in controlling inflation. 
Also from Table 1, it appears that, when the maintained 
hypothesis is either tax (T), government expenditure (G), or a 
combination of both (TG), controlling the supply of (or 
demand for) money does not have a significant effect on 
inflation. Thus, fiscal policy tended to have a greater impact 
than monetary policy on inflation.
With regard to unemployment, fiscal policy again indicated 
greater effect on unemployment than did monetary policy for
9 AIC = {-2 In maximised likelihood + 2 (number of independent 
parameters estimated)}.
the 1965-1990 period (see Table 2). With monetary policy as a 
maintained hypothesis, it is the government expenditure (G) 
alone and the combined tax and government expenditure (TG) 
which have the significant t-statistics. Tax receipts (T) alone did 
not show any significant impact on unemployment. Again, 
based on the Akaike's Information Criterion, government 
expenditure alone as policy appears to be the better model in 
solving unemployment. In this case, it appears that controlling 
the supply of (or demand for) money does not have a 
significant effect on unemployment either.
V. Conclusion
In this study, we apply the J-Test to a simple IS-LM model to 
test the relative effectiveness of fiscal and monetary policy on 
inflation and unemployment for the Australian economy 
during the period 1961-1990. In both the inflation and 
unemployment models, it appears that monetary policy did 
not work well over the study period. There exists no 
significant effect on inflation and unemployment by 
controlling the supply of (or the demand for) money, M2. It is 
fiscal policy which is effective in managing both inflation and 
unemployment. With monetary policy (via the use of M2) as a 
maintained hypothesis, tax (T) alone appears to be the most 
effective policy in controlling inflation; while government 
expenditure (G) alone appears to be the most effective tool in 
solving unemployment. In sum, it is the superiority of fiscal 
over monetary policy which was most effective in controlling 
inflation and unemployment in Australia over the study 
period.
Table 1 Modelling Inflation (1961-1990)
Policy M T G TG DW Log-Lik
Model 1 m 2.20* 1.25 -26.69
Model 2 m 1.05 1.51 -28.56
Model 3 m 2.19* 1.24 -26.70
Model 4 1.55 m 1.25 -26.69
Model5 1.46 m 1.51 -28.56
Model 6 1.52 m 1.25 -26.68
Note: * denotes significant at 5% level.
Table 2 Modelling Unemployment (1965-1990)
Polio/ M T G TG DW Log-Lik
Model 1 m 1.39 2.38 -13.56
Model 2 m 3.25* 2.36 -9.68
Model 3 m 3.26* 2.37 -9.66
Model 4 0.20 m 2.38 -13.57
Model5 -0.29 m 2.36 -9.68
Model 6 -0.30 m 2.37 -9.66
Note: * denote significant at 5% level.
APPENDIX: DATA
Data used in this article consist of M (log differences of M2 
money stock multiplied by 100), P (log differences of the CPI 
multiplied by 100), T (log difference of total government tax 
receipts multiplied by 100), UM (log difference of 
unemployment rate multiplied by 100), and G (log Differences 
of total government expenditure.) The M2 money stock is 
from the International Financial Statistics, IMF, various issues; 
the CPI series, the unemployment rate series, the total 
government tax receipts series, and the total government 
expenditure series are from the Australian Economic Statistics, 
Reserve Bank of Australia, 1949-50 to 1989-90.
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